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INTRODUCTION
Barry Friedman raises an important question in his new book:
whether a constitutional adjudicator can further public deliberation
1
on important matters of policy and rights. Friedman offers a positive
answer to this question in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the Court has encouraged democratic deliberation precisely by blocking the majority. He puts it this way:
The value of judicial review in the modern era is that it . . . . serves as a
catalyst for the American people to debate as a polity some of the most
difficult and fundamental issues that confront them. It forces the American people to work to reach answers to these questions, to find solu2
tions—often compromises—that obtain broad and lasting support.

To establish that Americans, or citizens of any large modern democracy, can be understood to deliberate intensively, if imperfectly,
on important issues of fundamental rights in ways that shape an
emerging consensus is a striking and important claim about the practice as well as the possibilities of modern democratic life. It is a claim
that contrasts sharply with the more or less standard political sociology of today’s citizen: Someone who mostly pays little attention to politics or public issues, and whose main concerns are with day-to-day existence; someone who can rouse herself to vote in elections from time
to time, but who is otherwise content to leave the resolution of political issues to elected officials.
And if Friedman is right, the phenomenon ought not to be limited to the United States, but ought to be found wherever the institutions and practices of constitutional adjudication arise. Since the
Second World War, many new democratic constitutions have created
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a constitutional court endowed with the authority to override decisions taken by other institutions and regulate the relations among
3
them. We have described the operation of some of these new institutions in earlier papers and have explored, briefly, some of the effects
of these courts on the operation of their democracies. The creation
of constitutional courts—with the power of a kind of judicial review—
in post-war Europe offers a kind of laboratory for the investigation of
Friedman’s hypothesis. There are, of course, many differences between American judicial review and European constitutional adjudication, but both practices are, essentially, countermajoritarian in that
both force the majority (either the parliamentary or popular majority) to revisit an issue it had tried to settle: To think again, to debate
and deliberate, and, in light of the court decision, to enact new law.
Later in this article, we shall begin a tentative set of explorations into
how Friedman’s hypothesis may extend to some European constitutional democracies.
Some readers have placed more emphasis on another phenomenon that Friedman discusses as well—cases in which the United States
Supreme Court has appeared to back down in the face of political
pressures or threats. Emily Bazelon, in her New York Times book review, for example, emphasizes Justice Owen Roberts’s famous “switch
4
in time” in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court’s apparent retreat
from rights of those accused or convicted of crimes, and its retreat
from the attempt to abolish the death penalty after Nixon’s 1972
5
crime-obsessed presidential campaign. There are many other examples she could have mentioned, many of which are amply discussed in
Friedman’s book. Such incidents, where judges retreat in the face of
popular or political pressures, are distressing insofar as they may
seem to undercut the idea that American democracy can tolerate truly independent judges or maintain rule of law. Indeed, Friedman
himself sometimes sounds exactly this theme, arguing that “[j]udicial
6
power exists at popular dispensation,” which can be read to suggest a
subordinate role for the Court.
But in this and other similar passages, Friedman is directing his
fire on a fairly narrow notion of judicial power: The idea that judges
could regularly and for long periods of time successfully impose their
views of the Constitution on an unwilling public. But it seems to us
3
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that this idea—judicial dictatorship—is really a straw man. Indeed,
Friedman quotes with approval a statement by two journalists: “No
appointive body of nine men can fly in the face of public opinion for
7
too long without provoking an answering attack.” But “judicial power” may be more limited than this: It may simply denote the possibility of the Court putting a stop to some legislative project and offering
reasons, grounded in constitutional interpretation, as to why the legislature or the people should respect its holding. Sometimes, of
course, the legislature or the people are moved to reject the Court’s
8
reasons, such as happened in the Legal Tender Cases.
Direct confrontations between the Court and the public are in
fact exceedingly rare. One could, however, point to particular instances such as that in 1937, when, so it must have seemed, high levels of public support for New Deal programs confronted a Court
bent on ruling that Congress lacked the authority to enact them.
But, the Court changed soon afterwards either as a result of Justice
Roberts’s change of heart or (more likely) because Franklin D. Roosevelt was soon able to appoint new Justices. But as F.D.R. was soon
to learn, popular support for an attack on the Court even then, when
he may have thought that the popular wind was behind him, was fragile, and evaporated once the President decided to try to pack the
Court with more favorable justices.
Indeed, the structure of the American constitutional system and
basic features of public opinion make such confrontations not only
9
rare, but also not very threatening to the Court. For the Court to actually face a genuine threat to its institutional power (i.e., to face a
credible threat of jurisdiction-stripping or court-packing legislation)
would require not only an aroused and focused public, but one that
stayed that way long enough to elect majorities in both chambers and
take the Presidency, too. How often can that sustained confluence
occur, given the disorganized nature of American public opinion and
notorious fragmentation of its political parties? Maybe in the early
1930s, something like this may have occurred. And maybe such an
alignment persisted for a while in the high period of Reconstruction
in 1866–1870. But in each case, the high state of popular arousal
7
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soon lapsed, and within a few years, F.D.R. was forced to give up on
his court-packing scheme. And the post-Reconstruction Court had
the chance to reinterpret the post-Civil War amendments as it
thought best, without worrying too much about what the public or its
political representatives would do. Simply put, the U.S. Constitution
and the United States’s relatively decentralized (and often disorganized) political parties make it very unlikely that the Court would face
a credible challenge to its authority to interpret the Constitution.
This is not to deny that on some particular issues, the Court needs
to be attentive to public views. The best examples are those in which
the Court had to worry about whether people or officials would actually pay attention to or comply with a particular ruling. Friedman
gives a range of significant examples: The refusal of the State of
10
Georgia to honor the Court’s holding in Worcester v. Georgia, the
Court’s worry that its ruling in Brown v. Board of Education would be
ignored in many school districts, and widespread noncompliance
11
with its school prayer ruling in Engel v. Vitale. What is significant in
these cases is that popular majorities were not needed to undercut
Court rulings. All that had to happen was for a few critically located
people or officials to refuse to respect or apply judicial rulings in circumstances where this refusal could not be easily challenged (or even
noticed). Here, the Court’s fear was not that it would be overpowered politically, but that it would simply be ignored or its rulings
disregarded.
But issues of this kind seem to us to illustrate the boundaries of
the judicial power to change an entrenched set of social practices.
These instances seem rare, even if they are dramatic. And it is hard
not to agree with Rosenberg that when they occur, the courts need
political reinforcements if the entrenched practices are to be
12
changed. And it is not clear that sustained political support for ending the practices could be sustained if it is sufficiently popular among
13
the people whose behavior has to change.

10

11

12
13

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561–63 (1832) (holding unconstitutional a
Georgia criminal statute prohibiting non-Indians from entering Indian lands without a
state license).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that New York’s program of daily
prayer was a religious activity, and use of public school system to encourage such prayer
was inconsistent with Establishment Clause of Constitution).
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 5 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991).
A similar issue arose in Germany when the FCC required that crucifixes be removed from
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Friedman’s more profound contribution, it seems to us, is in suggesting a more general approach to the question of how democracy
and legality interact. He observes that the Court and public opinion
rarely stay far apart for long periods, at least not on issues that are sig14
nificant to many people, but tend to converge over time. But there
are several ways that convergence can come about, each with different implications for law and democracy. The Court’s jurisprudence
could change because some members change their views, possibly in
response to felt political pressures, or because some members are replaced. But it is also possible that on some issues, public opinion
moves toward the Court’s favored position. Indeed, this movement
can be seen on the largest issue discussed in Friedman’s book—the
eventual and sometimes grudging popular acceptance of the practice
of judicial review even in cases where the public strongly disagreed.
The most important and surprising story Friedman tells is the one by
which the public, over time, moved toward the (antipopulist) views
articulated early on by Hamilton, Marshall, Story, and others, that the
proper body to adjudicate constitutional issues is an unelected panel
15
of politically-appointed judges, serving with life tenure.
Political
scientists call this disposition to accept even unpopular Court rulings
“diffuse” support, in that it gives the Court latitude (in public opi-
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See id. at 21 (citations omitted).
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convergence. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
Friedman, supra note 1, at 14–15.
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nion) to make unpopular decisions. But, and this is our emphasis, it
is possible that on some issues, both public and judicial views coevolve “deliberatively,” through what Friedman calls dialogue, in ways
that tend to move the two usually to converge rather than remain
apart. On controversial social issues such as abortion, gay rights, and
euthanasia, just such evolution seems to be taking place.
Friedman presents an ideal-typical sequence: “The Court rules.
The public responds. Over time, sometimes a long period, public
opinion jells, and the Court comes into line with the considered views
17
of the American public.” Friedman tends to emphasize in his examples the second part of this process, in which the Court somehow
does the conforming. He does not neglect the first stage—where the
public (if it pays much attention) responds to a decision and argues
and deliberates to arrive at its considered views on the matter. Rather, he puts less emphasis on this mechanism. And he certainly emphasizes that the public debate takes place in light of the actions of
the Court, and is therefore likely subject to judicial influence to some
extent. The emphasis on judicial conformity neglects the fact that in
most cases, it was a decision by the Court that set the public debate
going, and that the Court itself played a major role in laying out the
terms under which public arguments are made and judged. The
point is that the agenda is set and structured by an initial decision.
Thus, if the Court later on revises the initial decision or even overturns it, the basic ideas and considerations were, in many cases, already implicit (or even explicit) in its earlier rulings. If this is right, it
may not be accurate to think of the Court being pulled along by public opinion (which is, in many cases, not very well developed). It may
be more correct to view the Justices as deliberating through concrete
cases that come before them, while the public, too, deliberates, and
reflects on similar issues.
We do not need to take a strong view of deliberation to make
sense of this hypothesis. Deliberation is the process by which people
or groups decide what to do, and this typically involves weighing reasons for and against an action. Popular deliberation in a complex
modern democracy is necessarily messy and incomplete, and would
be regarded as imperfect by philosophers. In thinking about public
16
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deliberation, therefore, it is better to make use of a minimal notion
of “deliberation” to denote simply the use of argument and reasongiving in support of various courses of public action (even if these are
presented as terse phrases on placards). Think of the public debates
on abortion or gay marriage filled, as they are, with appeals to identity and emotion as well as logical argument. Even in these highly
emotive cases, the two sides have typically done much more than
simply shout out their preferred positions. Each side presents arguments, often, of course, based on premises that only they and their
allies share, and they work to craft alternative policies which they
hope can claim wider support than perhaps the core proponents of
the other side would want. But the fight is often for the middle
ground of uncommitted people who may not yet have formed deeply
held views. For example, abortion opponents, following repeated
judicial setbacks, have continually tried to craft new regulations that
might, they hope, be acceptable to state legislatures (which are presumably not controlled by or committed to one side or the other) as
well as to the Supreme Court. At the same time, opponents also try
to shift the membership of the political branches, as well as the
18
Court, in a favorable direction. Often, these new regulations attempt to appeal to some other norm, such as the view that teenagers
ought to be accountable to their parents for important decisions, or
19
that late-term abortion is difficult to distinguish from killing. Sometimes these appeals may “work,” in the sense of persuading those with
20
little prior stake in the issue. The same has been true on both sides
in the case of gay marriage. Again, we see a similar mix of argument
and campaigns for new state-level regulations aimed at winning the
21
support of the middling sort of voter to one side or the other.
18
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Therefore, as we see it, the central contribution of Barry Friedman’s book is in demonstrating how it is that, over the course of
American history, the Supreme Court has operated in a manner that
has induced a practice of widespread and real public deliberation on
difficult and important issues. In this sense, the countermajoritarian
nature of judicial review is not a “difficulty,” but an “opportunity.” A
countermajoritarian court can make it possible for a democracy to
become more deliberative.
Friedman demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court has put important issues on the political agenda and kept them there for long
time periods, prodding interest groups, political parties, other political institutions, and ultimately ordinary people to react and try to
find or create new initiatives that might pass constitutional muster.
In doing so, the Court has usually given shape to the conflict, laying
out constitutional issues that political actors have missed or undervalued, and articulated values that may be implicated in any eventual
legislation. And these efforts have shaped subsequent public debate
in various ways. At other times, the Court tried to settle difficult political disputes, sometimes quite controversially, in ways that may have
resolved the issue in question, but also revealed fundamental political
and constitutional conflicts in society. The effect in many cases has
been to open public deliberation widely, to provoke and activate a variety of people to argue and form interest groups, to inject and define
new issues concerning constitutional rights and values into the debate, and to keep the discussion going until some kind of resolution
can be found. Importantly, Court-induced deliberation has seldom
been restricted to occupants of formal governmental institutions, nor
to a narrow political or social elite, and certainly not to the judiciary
or to Court itself. Rather, it seems to have been more or less regularly open to new voices and new forms of speech and action arising
from the People Themselves (so to speak).
I. COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
First we should try to clarify a bit the idea of the countermajoritarian “difficulty,” which motivates Friedman’s study. When a court
strikes down legislation it is obviously thwarting a particular legislative
majority—those particular legislators who had voted for the legislation. This majority could, however, be quite transient: it could be
built out of a series of ad hoc compromises having to do with a specific bill. The representatives’ support for the statute might be based on
normatively irrelevant factors (like the fact that some members may
have voted for the bill in exchange for some favor or in response to a
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threat). In any case, the majority in the legislature may no longer enjoy popular support generally, and certainly not for the particular
piece of legislation. So what is actually wrong with a court striking
down such a law if, in its judgment, the legislation is constitutionally
defective? It is true that the legislative bargain would have been frustrated. But if that bargain lacks popular support, could one not say
that the court’s action was actually promajoritarian? So there are two
issues. First, what is the meaning of “countermajoritarian?” And
second, what is the normative problem with the court taking a countermajoritarian action (whatever that means)?
Something needs to be said about democracy in order to assess
the significance of the countermajoritarian problem. In our view,
there is not yet a satisfactory normative theory of representative government, and perhaps not even an attractive normative theory of
democracy either. We do not have space to try to supply such a
theory but will assume, for now, that democracy has to be justified as
some kind of self-rule. This can be given a positive or negative turn.
The positive view, articulated by Rousseau, is that to be a free person
22
is to be subject only to laws she herself makes. The difficulties with
this view are well known, and indeed notorious: Rousseau was driven
to engage in the controversial metaphysics of the general will to make
23
it seem plausible. Besides, in a large country, and at least since the
eighteenth century, most writers have thought it impossible that each
person could really be the author of the laws that bind her in the way
24
Rousseau posited.
Hans Kelsen gave a more modest answer along roughly the same
lines, saying that majority rule was a system of governing that max25
imized the fraction of people who could be free. Still, this seems a
22

23

24

25

Rousseau argues throughout his treatise that a person is free only if he is subject to rules
of his own making: “[T]o obey a law that we have imposed on ourselves is freedom.”
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
59 (Christopher Betts trans., 1994) [hereinafter THE SOCIAL CONTRACT]. “The people,
being subject to the laws, must create them . . . .” Id. at 75.
See Book II of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 63–90, for Rousseau’s description
of the “general will” and its properties. He argues there that each person in the state
shares in the general will and that the general will is the only legitimate source of laws.
So that the laws that bind each person are of his own making, which means that the state
enforcement of law is forcing the person to obey himself.
See BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1997). Manin
argues that it became widely accepted at that time that direct democratic rule of the kind
Rousseau prescribed was impossible in a large country, and thus, that representation by
elected elites was the only possible way that a nation could be “self”-governing.e
Kelsen’s argument originally appeared in HANS KELSEN, VOM WESEN UND WERT DER
DEMOKRATIE (1929), parts of which were published in English as ON THE ESSENCE AND
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bit of a trick, and not a very attractive normative position, because
nearly half the people may not be free under any given law. Moreover, it is not clear that this idea can extend in any meaningful way to
indirect or representative government in which ordinary people do
not vote on any laws. Kelsen himself was moved to introduce the notion of a party state in which people vote for disciplined political parties by majority rule, and the winning party forms the “will” of the
26
state. Kelsen finally argues that the notion of a party state in this
sense is consistent with the notion of an individual being free, even if
they are required to comply with laws they did not vote for (or those
27
enacted by a party they did not support).
The negative justification seems to us a bit more plausible—no
one else can be presumed to have the right to rule over you. So for
anyone to have a valid claim to such a right, you have to have given
your consent. This line of thinking is very old, of course, tracing cer28
tainly to Hobbes, but traces of it are found in classical sources, too.
But again there are many difficulties here also, not least of which is
interpreting what counts as giving consent. And in any case, what
reason is there to think that the kind of government you would agree
to would run itself on the principle of majority rule? Why would

26
27
28

VALUE OF DEMOCRACY, IN WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 84 (Arthur J. Jacobson &
Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper trans., 2000) [hereinafter ON THE ESSENCE AND
VALUE OF DEMOCRACY]. In a postwar English language paper, Kelsen reproduced the argument: “[I]t is the principle of simple majority which secures the highest degree of political freedom that is possible within society.” Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66
ETHICS: INT’L J. SOC. POL., & LEGAL PHIL. 25 (1955).
ON THE ESSENCE AND VALUE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 87–88, 92.
Id. at 89.
Hobbes wrote:
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from
the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure
them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they
may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their
wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint
one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person,
shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace
and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements, to his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity
of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with
every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and
give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 114 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 1996).
In the Crito, Socrates acknowledges that he has an obligation to the “laws” because he has
enjoyed the fruits of Athenian citizenship and therefore, implicitly consented to their
binding force. PLATO, COMPLETE WORKS, 37–48 (John M. Cooper ed., 1997).
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people not consent, instead, to a government that contained a court
with the power to correct the majority? At any rate, while the positive
justification (usually attributed to Rousseau and Kelsen) is aimed at
justifying majority rule, it is hard to see how the negative theory (neoHobbesian) could reach that form of rule (without adding a lot of
implausible assumptions). Thus, on either positive or negative accounts, it is hard to see the “difficulty.”
Things get worse when speaking of representative or indirect democracy. In such systems, representatives are chosen in relatively infrequent elections (for example, one day out of every two or four
years), and they have to deal with issues that cannot have been anticipated on election day and cannot, moreover, be explained to the
voters in any detail. Joseph Schumpeter presented a justification for
this kind of government based on the observation that ordinary
people cannot really be competent to determine what the best policies would be, and that as long as elections are contested, leaders are
somehow accountable to voters and their decisions are the best that
29
can be hoped for. Later on, Anthony Downs gave a more concrete
defense of Schumpeter’s idea that elite competition would tend to
30
produce good public policies. While the Schumpeter-Downs theory
has some attractions as a descriptive theory of how modern democracies work, its normative appeal seems limited and not well articulated.
Even if competitive democracy produces moderate outcomes (as the
median voter theorem implies in some cases), what is good about
that?
Hans Kelsen, in On the Essence and Value of Democracy, observed that
the majority from election day does not necessarily last for long, so
that (speaking in Rousseauian terms) some of those who were “free”
31
the day of election may become “un-free” just few days later. In any
representative democracy it is always possible to have a double majority where the parliamentary and popular majorities diverge, and this
indeed becomes likely as the election recedes in time. This elemen-

29
30

31

See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Harper &
Bros. 3d ed. 1950) (1942).
Downs’s theory relies on the median voter theorem—the notion that in a one dimensional policy space where all individuals have single-peaked preference orderings, the most
preferred policy of the median voter will not lose to any other policy in a majority vote.
Downs argues that if there are two parties engaged in competitive elections, each will find
it best to offer that position as its platform. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 117–22 (1957).
See ON THE ESSENCE AND VALUE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 25, at 87. The tragic instantiation of this was the Weimar republic, where the constituent and political majority of 1919
became a permanent minority in the country and in the Parliament starting in 1920!
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tary fact may justify some confusion about the countermajoritarian
difficulty. Any sensible person will ask: Which majority is being
thwarted by a decision of the constitutional adjudicator? Of course,
the standard theory of representative government rejects this dualism, saying that the only majority that counts is the majority of duly
elected representatives as they are entitled to represent the people
32
between elections. But this has always been a kind of fiction or exaggeration, as has become patently clear with the advent of public
opinion polls. In any representative democracy, there is always a kind
of double body of the people. A represented people: the elected officials
who claim to monopolize the role of authorized interpreter of the
33
popular will. But at the same time, there is also the popular majority
itself, which can be revealed or measured with some accuracy, and
while this majority may itself change (and while the meaning of public opinion polls can be challenged), it cannot be completely suppressed by the representatives. In this sense, the popular majority is
itself a somewhat autonomous political actor in constitutional politics. Because the popular and the represented majority can diverge,
the constitutional courts can play an important role in reconciling
them. In the French and Italian cases that we are analyzing, the
trend seems to have been to push the representatives to converge
with public opinion, but evidently, there are cases in which the
movement is the other way around (one can think of the decision of
the South African Constitutional Court cancelling the death penalty
in agreement with the representative majority and against the majori34
ty of the public opinion). It is wrong to assume as Gospel the principle vox populi vox dei.
In any case, modern democracies are not purely representative or
indirect. Even where voters cannot vote directly on laws in popular
initiatives or referenda, voters can and do often form and express
opinions about what should be done. The voters can and do learn
things about some legislative proposals from many sources (newspapers, interest groups, opponents, comedians, etc.) and sometimes
form opinions as to what should be done. Therefore, while the rep32

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
(2d ed. 1986).
This “interpreted” popular will stands for the will of the people only by synecdoche, since
the majority of the representatives pretend to speak for the people as a whole. Notice
that nowadays, in countries like Italy and France, the leader of the majority claims to monopolize this interpretative role and to assert that, like Louis the XVI, he is the true representative of the people. As a result, these democracies start looking a little bit like
elected absolute regimes.
State v. T. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 665 (S. Afr.).
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resentatives may have a legal claim to monopolize the legislative power, their normative claim is a little shaky, or at least contested. After
all, on some issues, the people may know very well what they want
even if their representatives have quite different views. One could say
that the people simply have to wait until the next election day to get
rid of the representatives they do not like. But why? Why would the
people not prefer to have a representative government that has
courts with the power to interfere with the legislative majority? Why
couldn’t they refuse to concede the whole legislative power to the
representatives and instead create courts with the power to check legislative acts? And if that is what they prefer, who is to say that when
the court strikes down a legislative act, that this is a “difficulty”?
We argue that in a modern, representative government, there are
really three constitutional actors: The representatives, public opinion, and the constitutional adjudicator. Each of them has a kind of
normative power. The representatives may be highly competent to
make judgments as to public interests and effective means to pursue
them. And courts have strong normative claims based on values of
law and justice. But while the people (public opinion) may be less
competent in making certain kinds of judgments than the other constitutional actors, in a democracy, they cannot be ignored if they have
a strong and stable view. In the end, the people can replace the others. In effect, then, constitutional history is a stage on which these
three actors interact, and where the countermajoritarian power of
the court is the power to force the other actors to deliberate again
about what to want or do.
II. DELIBERATION
We need to distinguish between descriptive and normative accounts of deliberation. Deliberation may be defined as the process by
which people or groups decide what to do. It can be done well or
badly, like anything else, but always involves deciding on the best
course of action in view of relevant reasons. Agreeing on which kinds
of reasons are relevant or appropriate for evaluating possible actions
is often difficult and controversial. In a modern, constitutional democracy, most would agree that the fit of a potential public action
with the constitution or its animating principles would count as a
consideration. But there would remain disagreement as to what the
constitution requires or what its basic principles are.
In a modern democratic state, real deliberative activity takes place
in the context of a sprawling and complex set of governing institutions and a diverse civil society, and is structured by the makeup of
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those amorphous entities. It is not particularly egalitarian in practice,
displaying all the biases (toward wealth, education, and political enthusiasm) that sociologists and political scientists have documented
35
in myriad studies of political participation. Secondly, we need to
keep in mind that actual deliberation is not made of cool appeals to
reason, but entails frequent resort to emotional appeals, demonstrations, strikes, and tax revolts, as well as sporadic acts of violence.
Most frequently, it seems to us, public deliberation is marked by the
formation and regular activities of associations and organizations,
and by the mobilization of resources of influence throughout civil society and around political and judicial institutions. In that respect,
much public deliberation is effectively routinized in the everyday actions of organized groups and associations, such as raising money,
lobbying, advertizing, and recruiting both members and policy makers. Reasons and reasoning play an important role in some of these
activities, but no one should mistake popular deliberation for a seminar in a classroom.
However, as John Rawls argued in his very important book, Political Liberalism, within the American constitutional system, the Supreme
36
Court has played an exemplary deliberative role. The notion that
the Court is exemplary conveys a clear, normative endorsement of its
deliberative practices. As he put it: “[I]n a constitutional regime
with judicial review, public reason is the reason of its supreme
37
court.” Rawls focused, in that passage, on the Court’s practice of
producing opinions based on what he called “public reason”—the
kinds of reasons that could be endorsed by people holding any rea38
sonable comprehensive view. He pointed out that “public reason is
well suited to be the court’s reason in exercising its role as the high39
est judicial interpreter.” Presumably, this is so because the materials
that the Court can draw on to justify its rulings are confined to public
and legal materials, broadly construed (obviously there is much internal disagreement within the court as to which materials are to be
employed). At the same time, Rawls acknowledged that the Court is
the:
highest judicial interpreter but not the final interpreter of the higher
law . . . .[I]n constitutional government the ultimate power cannot be left

35
36
37
38
39

See generally SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972).
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (expanded ed. 2005).
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
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to the legislature or even to a supreme court . . . .Ultimate power is held
by the three branches in a duly specified relation with one another with
40
each responsible to the people.

Rawls’s argument that the Supreme Court is an exemplary deliberative institution has two aspects. First, he suggested that Supreme
Court justices typically deliberate by limiting the arguments they
make in a particular sense: Using only arguments that do not rely on
contested comprehensive doctrines, but are restricted to legal materials and principles (public reason). And secondly, by calling the
Court an exemplar, he implied that the Justices made the contents of
their deliberations (their reasons and reasoning) transparent and ac41
cessible to outsiders. By describing the Court in this way, Rawls
seemed to imply either that other American institutions could not be
expected to deliberate in one or both of these ways, or that (for some
reason) they may fail for various reasons to do so. In this respect, the
Court constituted a special kind of forum: A place where public reason could be expected to prevail, if it could prevail anywhere.
Jurgen Habermas, in his magisterial review of Rawls’s theories,
raised an objection to the idea that any court had or should have had
42
this kind of special status in a democracy. His concern was that
courts were institutions that vindicated liberal rights (property and
civil liberties), and to accord them special status would tend to exalt
such rights over collective or democratic rights. In this essay, he argued that “[f]or the higher the veil of ignorance is raised . . . the
more Rawls’s citizens . . . find themselves subject to principles and
norms that have . . . already become institutionalized beyond their
43
control.” He goes on to say that for Rawls, “the act of founding the
democratic constitution cannot be repeated” and, therefore, “the
public use of reason does not actually have the significance of a
44
present exercise of political autonomy.” These criticisms amount to
arguing that Rawls, in both of his major books, elevated the protection of liberal rights (the liberties of the moderns)—and, presuma-

40
41

42

43
44

Id. at 231–32.
As we have written elsewhere, constitutional courts vary greatly in how fully internal
reasons are revealed publically. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional
Courts as Deliberative Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice,
in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST:
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 21–36 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002).
Jurgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s
Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 128 (1995) (critiquing John Rawls’s theories and assertions in his book Political Liberalism).
Id.
Id.
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bly, the institutions charged with protecting them—over the democratic rights (the liberty of the ancients). Habermas claimed that this
was institutionalized in Rawls’s liberal constitution, and therefore
permitted the judicial use of reason to regulate and limit the auton45
omy of citizens.
Rawls replied to these criticisms by clarifying (and possibly revising) the arguments in the expanded edition of Political Liberalism
46
published posthumously. In effect, Rawls argued that the constructions advanced in the two books did not elevate one kind of liberty
over the other, and citizens were capable of full political autonomy in
the sense of being free to reconstruct their constitutional arrange47
ments at any time. He did not deny that a people could establish a
supreme court that could act in a countermajoritarian fashion, but
denied that such a court would have ultimate authority of the kind
48
Habermas thought it would. When, in reply to Habermas, he revisited the issue, he wrote: “In discussing what I call the wide view of
public political culture, we shall see that the idea of public reason
applies more strictly to judges than to others, but that the requirements
49
of public justification for that reason are always the same.” Moreover,
he had already argued (in the original edition) that legislators and
members of the executive branch, as well as ordinary citizens, ought to
be guided by public reason as well, at least when they are making de50
cisions concerning fundamental rights or constitutional essentials.
After all, as he insisted, “public reason is the reason of equal citizens
who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power
over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitu51
tion.” But Rawls also insisted that “the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involv52
ing . . . ‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice.” He
emphasized that many political questions (he lists taxes, property
regulation, and environmental legislation) may not concern such
matters and says that (insofar as some question does not) “the restrictions imposed by public reason may not apply to them; or if they do,
53
not in the same way, or so strictly.” The picture we are left with is
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
See generally RAWLS, supra note 36.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted) (emphases added).
RAWLS, supra note 36, at 216–17.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 215.
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one of a supreme court that is to be guided by public reason at all
times, and of other political officials (and citizens as well) who are to
be so guided on some occasions, but less so on others. And when
others have made decisions infringing on fundamental rights, the
court may be called upon to play a special role in regulating these officials in a countermajoritarian fashion.
We agree that the other political institutions may be less likely to
be guided by public reason because of certain of their organizational
characteristics. The Executive Branch is, perhaps, too hierarchically
organized and probably too disposed to secrecy to expose its own inner workings or to allow for open and impartial deliberation. Moreover, it constantly has access to the means to permit it to sidestep
demands for justification. It is unrealistic to expect its members to
have the moral strength to forbear in using them. And members of
Congress might seem too given to political posturing and pandering
to constituents to permit the free exchange of ideas contemplated by
advocates of deliberation. We cannot always expect the members of
that branch to act as public reason demands, even in cases where it is
morally required of them. Because of these practical considerations,
we would expect a supreme court (if one is created) to have a special
burden—-to correct the failures of other institutions or, indeed,
those of citizens themselves. And we can agree with Rawls that for
these reasons it has played a distinctive role in public deliberation.
But this is not to say that other institutions, and the people generally,
do not deliberate in a meaningful and important (if messy) sense.
Indeed, as Friedman has pointed out, we need to see that there is an
important and little understood connection between popular deliberations and deliberations in the Supreme Court. Implicitly, it seems
to us, Rawls was suggesting that the way deliberation worked (and
could best work) in a large modern democracy was by recognizing
that certain institutions—the Supreme Court was the most visible to
him—had the capacity and the institutional location to deliberate effectively on constitutional issues, giving that institution a special obligation to review and correct other agencies when they threaten fundamental rights. It is not that these other agencies are not required
to deliberate in public reason when such issues are at stake, but only
that they are designed in ways (for good reasons) that make them
54
more likely to make certain kinds of mistakes from time to time.
54

As we have suggested already, one could even read Rawls as anticipating some of Friedman’s findings. Rawls implied that even narrowly court-situated deliberation might play a
public role in a demonstrative sense: Allowing citizens to see court-offered reasons for
decisions as reasons each person could embrace. See RAWLS, supra note 36, at 233. On
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Again, the justification for a special role for the Court is not that the
public reason requirement does not apply to all political officials and
indeed, to citizens when they are acting on constitutional essentials
and fundamental rights. When a question comes up before a constitutional court (or the supreme court as Rawls used the term), it will
frequently concern exactly the kind of issue in which other institutions may have failed to resist the temptation to use nonpublic reasons, a temptation that the United States Supreme Court is particularly well-suited to resist.
The Court is especially well-composed from a deliberative viewpoint: It is made up of equals with secure tenure and assured salaries; it conducts its business through argument and persuasion; there
is broad agreement among the Justices as to what kind of arguments
would count as persuasive (even though there is much disagreement
as to particular arguments); and there is no use of force, bribery, or
intimidation. It is constructed in ways that make it, as much as possible, capable of deciding issues in an impartial fashion. So, from the
standpoint of constitutional design, the creation of a court with such
capacities and duties seems a sound idea—one that people might well
endorse in their constitutional convention, as Rawls suggested.
Some of Rawls’s critics have argued, however, that as sound as his
intuitions may have been, an unintended consequence of a strongly
deliberative court would be to make the other branches more likely
to act irresponsibly on matters trespassing on constitutional essen55
tials. Why would the legislature consider seriously whether some
popular act—a statute criminalizing flag burning, for example—
infringes a fundamental right if the court can be counted on to fix
the problem later on (and take the heat for it)? The political attraction of taking a stand against burning the flag might be too much of a
temptation for many congressmen to resist. In this sense, the creation of a supreme court with powers to overturn statutes and decrees
might be said to reduce the amount of deliberation that takes place
elsewhere in the government or in civil society.
Friedman’s study gives reasons to doubt this criticism of Rawls
and, indeed, grounds for advancing the opposite view. He suggests,
as we read him, that a countermajoritarian court can actually increase

55

this interpretation, Rawls thought that even if few people participate in real deliberations,
most or all of us can take part “virtually,” by discussing and arguing among ourselves the
opinions generated by the justices.
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (2008) (illustrating why congressional leaders may take actions that they know the Court will reject).
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the quality and quantity of deliberation by provoking public discourse
and effectively encouraging new arguments that develop in the rough
56
and tumble of public debate. In this respect, the Court’s role is not
so much “exemplary” as it is stimulative or provocative. Of course,
the Justices have no monopoly in shaping the resulting public discourse. Think of the shifts in the debates on abortion since the Roe v.
Wade decision: Outrage over the Court’s intervention gave rise to the
formation of new groups and the formulation of new state level regulatory policies, or of the creation of various legislative initiatives
aimed at restricting or expanding gay rights in various ways. Courts
were forced, repeatedly, to respond to these new legislative adventures and sometimes the Supreme Court itself had to resolve the issues. And as these issues arose, the membership of the Court also
evolved, partly in response to the political consequences of these
reactions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Friedman, of course, was not making philosophical arguments,
but engaged in a descriptive historical enterprise. He showed that
those actually engaged in popular deliberation do more than simply
give persuasive arguments—they mobilize and deploy valuable economic resources to gain attention and organize public action. Real
deliberation in a large and complex modern nation state is an economic activity in this respect, and includes the resources devoted to
forming organizations, to advancing political aims, to lobbying political officials, and to supporting and opposing candidates for elective
and appointive office (including, importantly, judgeships). But this
very list suggests that the use of resources by policy advocates goes far
beyond finding a stage and microphone with which to advance reasonable views with the aim to persuade those who hold power: It
amounts to the creation and use of power itself. And, though the
boundaries can be hard to see sometimes, in the end there is a material difference between persuasion and various other ways of influencing public policies.
Ultimately, there seem to be two reasons that popular deliberation
(and deliberation among political officials, too) may fall short of the
philosophical ideal, one arising from a realistic view of the person,
the other from a realistic view of modern society. First, ordinary
people are usually inattentive to many political issues, and they may

56

FRIEDMAN, supra note 1.
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simply not care to exercise whatever cognitive abilities they have to
reason about public policies. And, as many psychological experiments have demonstrated, everyone has cognitive biases and limitations that interfere with rational information processing.
Second, in the context of a large and complex society, making effective arguments requires the use of economic and political power.
However, exercises of political or economic power do not necessarily
correspond with better arguments. Still, these “realistic” objections
notwithstanding, a minimal commitment to democratic rule requires
us to see popular deliberation as having some normative claim on
public officials. The nature of that claim is contingent and often
frail, but sometimes popular arguments can (despite all) have some
of the force of reason. At any rate, political officials ought not to ignore this possibility.
When it comes to courts, however, these realistic considerations
have less significance. Judges can be seen as (rough) equals in intellect and training and in a sworn allegiance to law. They are assisted
by able clerks and persuasive lawyers (on both sides) and indeed by
many other resources drawn from the legal and policy communities.
Moreover, they can be expected to have somewhat worked out views
of divisive social issues of the kind that appear in courts with some
frequency. Therefore, while individual judges no doubt have personal biases and cognitive limits like anyone else, the context of judging
may tend to ameliorate these limitations. Moreover, coercion, intimidation, and pecuniary motivations are never countenanced in
courts. One could hope and even expect that reasoned deliberation
will prevail in courts. We have argued in other papers that precisely
because judges (usually) do not have reason to take account of career
considerations (except, of course, when they are forced to stand for
57
election in a competitive contest) they are subjected—and are able
to subject themselves—to a more demanding requirement of justifi58
cation of their decisions. Broadly speaking, we think this means that
one can understand higher courts—appellate courts and especially
constitutional courts or supreme courts—as capable of deliberating
in the more rigorous sense presented by Rawls or Habermas.
We have argued elsewhere that the deliberative role of courts has
to be considered in two separate contexts. Justices in many courts deliberate internally (among themselves) in order to agree on their deci57
58

Of course, if appellate court judges think they could be nominated for a seat on the Supreme Court, careerist concerns might play some role in their decisions.
See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 41, at 22 (arguing that “constitutional courts face
special and demanding deliberative expectations”).
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sions. But they also, in some form or other, offer reasons for their
decisions to the public and, in this respect, engage in external or pub59
Both kinds of deliberation involve persuasive
lic deliberation.
speech, but the qualities of the interlocutors are obviously very differ60
ent. The public context of “external” deliberation requires that the
notion of “deliberation” shift a bit to take account of realistic considerations just discussed: The skills, education, and attention span of
citizens and public officials and their greatly unequal positions of
wealth and power. And, in addition, the peculiar ways that the public, or parts of it, is able to express itself in the democratic context—
by means of elections, of course, but also in many other channels
(formation of interest groups, lobbying, demonstrations, etc.). Acknowledging these aspects of the communicative circumstances
seems unavoidable in a modern democracy. But to acknowledge political reality in this way is not to diminish the importance of the phenomenon of public deliberation on important issues, which is what
Friedman explores in his book.
It seems likely that the U.S. Supreme Court stands out from other
constitutional adjudicators in that it engages in much more external
or public deliberation than do its peer institutions in other countries.
Partly, this is a matter of public or differing political cultures. But
partly, it seems due to institutional differences among the courts and
specifically to the fact that the Supreme Court has adopted practices
which facilitate its external role: Specifically, the practice of publishing multiple opinions makes visible to outsiders the nature of the divisions among supporters and opponents of particular arguments and
interpretations.
As is well known, the practice of issuing dissents and concurrence
has fluctuated over time, but really began to take off early in the
1940s when the Court began actively to regulate issues of personal liberty such as speech, religion, equality, police activities, and rights of
61
the accused. These issues were not only highly divisive in many cas-
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Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 3, at 1679 (noting that the issuance of multiple opinions
from courts at all levels provides the public with the opportunity to view and comment
upon variations in legal reasoning).
This is a difficult and underexplored topic, and one of us (Pasquino) is doing further
research on it.
The standard dating of this turn is 1938, when Justice Stone inserted his famous footnote
in his opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (applying minimal scrutiny to the economic regulation at issue). The footnote suggested that a
higher level of scrutiny would be warranted in cases where there was a potential violation
of liberties protected by the Constitution, noting that the Court would pay special attention to the violations of the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.” But it was entirely
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es, but also their regulation required members of the Court to craft
new and persuasive theories to support these decisions and such
theories were also divisive. The standard explanation of this change
traces it to Chief Justice Stone’s permissive attitude toward the practice of multiple-opinion writing (compared to the disapproving attitude of his predecessors), but we think that the change in the Court’s
agenda, signaled in Justice Stone’s famous “footnote 4” is at least as
important. In any case, it must not be forgotten that, unlike other
constitutional adjudicators, the U.S. Supreme Court administers diverse judicial systems and that its primary tool for doing this is to provide doctrinal guidance to state as well as federal courts. Obviously,
this task became much more demanding as the Court expanded its
constitutional reach into new and highly conflictual domains after
62
Carolene Products.
To the extent that Friedman is correct, he highlights an important
and overlooked aspect of American democracy. In effect, he has
shown that, to a greater extent than many have believed, American
democracy can be described as, in some way, a deliberative democracy, however imperfect and distorted many of its practices may be.
Moreover, his work suggests that American democracy owes its deliberative character partly to the presence of a powerful nonmajoritarian institution, able and willing to check legislative majorities and
other governmental institutions when they cross constitutional boun-

62

unclear how and when this would be done, as nearly every element of the footnote required explication of a kind that could only be worked out as new cases came to the
Court.
Political scientists tend to characterize the rise of dissents and concurrences as
representing a decline in consensual norms on the Court, imagining that the Court can
be understood as a more or less integrated social group bound by internal norms of various sorts. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual
Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874–75 (1998) (arguing that levels of concurrence and dissent on the U.S. Supreme Court are functions of norms that arise from
Justices’ individual behaviors). For a recent survey of this issue and a statistical analysis of
the relation among the shift in the Court’s agenda after 1938 and dissents and concurrences, see MARCUS E. HENDERSHOT ET. AL., REVISITING THE MYSTERIOUS DEMISE OF
CONSENSUAL NORMS IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1 (Apr. 1–3, 2010) (arguing that many
influences contributed to the increased usage of concurring and dissenting opinions on
the U.S. Supreme Court). While we agree that much can be learned about the behavior
of the Justices over time from this perspective, we think it understates the importance of
the changing substance of the Court’s docket. Therefore, we emphasize instead the distinctive demands the Court faced when it shifted its focus from regulating economic policy to protecting personal rights and liberties. To some extent, the acceptance of this new
agenda probably mandated some shift in internal deliberative norms, permitting the Justices to explore and develop new doctrines in new areas of personal liberty and also, to
some extent, engage in external expression of reasons in the larger political and legal
community.
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daries. In this way, the countermajoritarian actions of the Court have
represented an opportunity for democracy, at least as much as it has
been a “difficulty.” By blocking the majority, the Court has opened
up deliberative space to a wider set of participants, leading them to
organize themselves to advocate new policies and articulate reasons
for them that might persuade those in the middle. To be sure, countermajoritarian actions can slow things down and sometimes prevent
a majority from getting what it wants. That can be costly and is surely
painful to those who have newly arrived in government. But the advantages of extending and opening public debate are real and lasting,
too, and should not be discounted.
Moreover, Friedman’s argument supports the notion that this is
not at all a new phenomenon but one which has been evolving since
the earliest days of the republic. In a recent book, William Eskridge
and one of us have argued that the Court often has (and ought to)
embrace a deliberation-inducing posture relative to the other
63
branches. As we understand his book, Friedman has extended this
view to the length of American history, and to public debate as well as
official policy making. While he has made great strides in describing
dialogic practices, he has spent less effort (as far as we know) in showing analytically how it was possible for the Court to play the role he
describes. One can pose this question at either the constitutional
level or at the level of institutional practices on the Court. At the
constitutional level, the answer seems easy: The constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and the difficulties in overriding
Court decisions turn out to be sufficiently high hurdles that successive Courts have been able to resist popular and governmental pressures for long periods of time. It can keep unpopular points of view
alive even when others think they are settled. Or it can open up longsettled agreements to renewed political debate and disagreement.
The Court itself has also adopted internal practices and “institutions” that permit it to play its deliberation-inducing role more successfully. These practices include open oral argument and the publication of multiple opinions, which permit the different sides of
controversial policies to be laid out publicly in ways that allow public
officials and interested citizens to understand not only the ruling, but
63

See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (presenting a nontraditional framework for thinking about American constitutionalism). This view is developed further in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (2009) (arguing that judges should listen to and respect other
institutions).
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possible alternatives. In an earlier article, we distinguished between
internal and external deliberation in constitutional courts: internal
deliberation is aimed at persuading other justices, ideally leading to
the formation of a consensus or compromises on an opinion for the
court. This kind of intensive, internal deliberation is common in
constitutional courts in Germany and Italy. External deliberation is
aimed at persuading external publics or, as Friedman stresses, provoking and stimulating them to deliberate about the issue. From the
standpoint of the Court, both kinds of deliberation have benefits, but
both have costs as well; the American Court is distinguished from
other constitutional courts in placing so much weight on external deliberation.
In a way, therefore, Friedman’s work can be seen as justifying on
deliberative grounds the rigid, supermajoritarian constitutional structures that many democrats have previously criticized. He might even
say that without an “obdurate constitution” (to use Larry Sager’s locu64
tion ), our deliberative democratic practices would not have developed; we might have evolved a system in which policies rapidly reflected the preferences of the current majority. On these grounds,
he might defend the high hurdles of Article V, which have seemed, to
many democrats, to be thinly-veiled bulwarks of privilege.
Others have argued that certain countermajoritarian actions of
courts can be democracy enhancing, either by guaranteeing that
65
democratic preconditions are actually satisfied or by arguing that
courts have an important democratic pedigree so that their actions
66
are indirectly democratic. Others go further and essentially rede67
fine democracy to include the (judicial) protection of liberal rights.
Friedman’s argument largely sidesteps these issues and focuses instead on a different mechanism. Indeed, he tends to resist the whole
idea of a tension between the majority and the Court, emphasizing
that the Court and public opinion eventually come into some kind of
“agreement.” But if this convergence is generated by the Court’s caving in to popular views, there would be little reason to think that the
Court is enhancing democracy in any of the ways argued above. But
we think he is committed to no such claim. Once the door to delibe64
65
66
67

See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:
A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 82 (2004).
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102–
03 (1980).
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
See Frank Michelman, Democracy and Positive Liberty, BOSTON REV., (Oct.–Nov. 1996)
http://bostonreview.net/BR21.5/michelman.html (reviewing Dworkin’s substantive definition of democracy).
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ration is opened, convergence may be generated in any number of
ways, including public acceptance of judicial views or (more likely) a
dialogue between the Court and the people that leads to a stable outcome.
As we emphasized at the start of this essay, it may be important to
recognize that the quality of deliberation that occurs in the highest
court may be different than that which occurs among ordinary citizens. Rawls’s claim that the Supreme Court is exemplary may seem to
endorse that idea. This recognition may not, however, undermine
the achievement of a moderately deliberative democracy which
Friedman credits to the Court. People differ greatly in their abilities
to make persuasive arguments, and one might think that these differences would tend to produce a deliberative elite. For example, it may
be helpful to remember that Classical Athens, surely as democratic a
government as has ever existed, was led throughout the middle of the
fifth century by Pericles, an orator whose speeches have justly sur68
vived to the present day. And a century later, Demosthenes and Aeschines and a few others seem to have dominated the Athenian courts
and assembly, in the sense that they were generally the most persua69
sive speakers and were recognized as such. There seems little doubt
that these orators were especially proficient in making persuasive arguments and especially in getting Athenians to agree to very costly
70
policies. But their persuasiveness does not undermine the claim
that the causes they advanced were made attractive by their being
presented as being in the enlightened interest of the demos. The
rhetors’ influence may have been largely due to their ability to get
ordinary people to see where their shared interest lay.
Some of the differences in capacities to deliberate effectively may
be “natural,” but probably most are due to education, social and institutional circumstances. Thus, to argue that the Supreme Court has
operated to make American democracy more deliberative is not necessarily to argue that it has made it more democratic if that notion
embeds an egalitarian aspect. Whether or how deliberation and de68

69
70

Of course, we do not have Pericles’s words directly from him, but only from the masterful
telling of Thucydides. See THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Henry Dale trans., Harper & Brothers 1863) (431 B.C.E.) (providing an account of the Peloponnesian War in Ancient Greece).
See MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES
(1999).
Demosthenes, for example, repeatedly convinced the Athenians to oppose and resist the
rising power of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, with dreadful consequences for Athenian democracy. For an example of Demosthenes’s persistant militance against the Macedonians, see 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 397 (1992).
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mocracy fit together seems to be partly a question of definitions (as
we implied above), and partly a question of how political institutions
actually work. But Friedman argues, strikingly, that the kind of deliberation the Court has induced has opened public deliberation to
many new groups and factions. So, at the very least, the Court has
opened up debates to new points of view situated outside government
and outside the settled boundaries of politically correct beliefs, even
if each of these new viewpoints are themselves expressed by elites.
IV. EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE
Since the Second World War, a number of countries have established constitutional courts and given them the power to overturn
legislation. This means, of course, that the United States is no longer
alone in permitting judges to correct or cancel the actions of the majority. This new constitutional development permits us to ask Friedman’s question in other contexts: Has the introduction of a judicial
power to overturn legislation promoted more widespread deliberation? There are of course many differences between constitutional
courts and the American Supreme Court, and, indeed, among the
new constitutional courts. One difference is that constitutional
courts have a narrowly focused mission to review state actions to see if
they violate the Constitution, whereas the Supreme Court of the
United States (“SCOTUS”) has a much broader mandate. Secondly,
the constitutional court is not a part of the judiciary as the SCOTUS
is, but stands outside it. Third, the constitutional court has a monopoly on the power to conduct constitutional review—other courts
cannot strike down legislation on constitutional grounds. Fourth, the
membership of these new courts is chosen differently from the way
ordinary judges get their jobs. Whereas ordinary judges in continental Europe are often chosen in competitive civil service examinations,
constitutional judges are more frequently chosen “politically,” in that
some body (perhaps the legislature) elects or nominates them discretionarily. In addition to these institutional differences, the new constitutional courts have adopted some common practices—they rarely
permit open oral argument, and few of them permit the publication
of multiple opinions. Rather, the courts usually deliberate in camera
until they reach a consensus around a single opinion that is issued in
the name of the whole court.
In addition to these general similarities among constitutional
courts, there are also some notable differences among them. The
one we have singled out in our previous work is the way the court can
be asked to make a constitutional ruling. We have argued that there
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are three ideal, typical methods of posing constitutional questions
which we have called French, Italian, and German. Other courts
have generally adopted one or the other of these three methods of
referral. The French referral has (since 1974) been that a parliamentary minority refers a statute passed by the legislature but not yet
promulgated to the Conseil Constitutionnel. The Constitutional Court
(C.C.) then has a month to decide whether the statute is constitutional, and, if the answer is yes, the statute is then promulgated as a
law.
The Italian method permits an ordinary judge, in the course of
hearing a case, to refer the question of a statute’s constitutionality to
the Constitutional Court, which will then resolve the constitutional
issue and refer the matter back to the ordinary judge for application
to the case.
The German method occurs much later in the legal process: after
someone has exhausted all legal avenues in ordinary courts, if she
feels that her constitutional rights have been violated she can file a
constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, which is obliged to rule on that question.
There are many other important differences between these courts
(and others), but the differences in the method of referral seems to
us crucial for several reasons. First, the differences affect the speed
with which constitutional questions are addressed: In France, the
constitutional question is posed very quickly and at an abstract level
(without a concrete case) in front of an existing government committed to the legislation; in Italy, it takes somewhat longer because a
court case must be filed and the constitutional issue raised during the
trial. In Germany (as in the United States), the process takes longer
since other legal avenues have to be exhausted before a constitution71
al complaint can be filed. This difference in speed is relevant to the
size of the audience of the opinion of the C.C. In France, the audience is the government and the parliament. If a statute is struck
down in whole or part, it is they who have to deliberate and react,
formulating new legislation. In Italy, it is the ordinary judge whose
task it is to apply the laws, as long as they are constitutional, and the
legal community who has the duty to represent litigants. And in
Germany, the audience includes the judge whose decision is challenged, but is also includes, in a sense, the whole body of citizens who

71

In exceptional cases, though, the constitutional complaint can be sent to the German
Constitutional Court immediately if there is a reason for fearing irreparable damages to
the plaintiff.
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need to know if and when they have reason to file a complaint before
the Constitutional Court (which can be done without the assistance
of a lawyer).
Evidently, the European constitutional courts, like the USSC, can
use countermajoritarian measures to stop or slow down majorities,
and thereby make space and time for political deliberation. But unlike the constitutional courts, the Supreme Court gives a lot of guidance to subsequent debates. The USSC holds highly visible public
oral argument, and it often issues multiple (conflicting) opinions that
serve to guide judges, legislators, and interest groups in understanding the thinking behind its decisions. Such information is obviously
valuable not only in applying Supreme Court rulings in lower courts
and administrative agencies, but also in formulating new legislative
and administrative initiatives. Importantly, the production of multiple opinions on important legal issues encourages press coverage
and popular attention to the substantial matters at stake, and serves
72
to widen the discussions to the broader public.
By contrast, what we have called the practices of external deliberation are relatively meager in European constitutional courts. The
courts deliberate in closed sessions and issue single opinions justifying their decisions. In some courts, notably French courts (until
quite recently), the decisions have to be issued very quickly, and the
accompanying opinions are therefore brief and technical. In Italy
(and now in France as well), decisions and opinions are directed to a
specialized audience—the judge who referred the constitutional
question—and secondarily to the legal community. In Germany, the
decision directs an offending official (a judge or administrator) to
correct an action that violates the constitutional rights of a complaining citizen. In all of these cases, reasons are given to justify the decision, but the reasons offered are given in the name of the whole
court. This practice makes it difficult for those on the outside, especially nonlawyers, to know very much about the internal conflicts and
controversies surrounding a decision or to know very much about the
73
range of possible legislative actions that would satisfy the court.
72

73

We cannot be too sanguine about these effects. It seems possible that the flood of dissenting opinions in the last decades produces a cynical attitude among American law students that seems completely absent among European law students.
Lawyers who follow the constitutional court closely can, of course, make sophisticated
inferences from the language of the opinion or gain inside information in various ways.
But these constitutional court “Kremlinologists” are a small, external audience. It is not
possible to find in Europe a Linda Greenhouse or Adam Liptak or Jeffrey Rosen, who
have devoted their considerable intellects and persistence to explaining what the United
States Supreme Court has done in specific decisions and why.
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We may illustrate these points by considering some controversial
and important decisions reached by three European constitutional
courts. We will focus on several recent decisions in the three constitutional courts we have discussed. In Italy, we shall consider two cases: the Di Bella case where the court forced the government to pay
74
for a dubious cancer treatment, and the Italian Constitutional
Court’s (ICC) nullification of the law protecting the prime minister
75
Silvio Berlusconi from prosecution while he remained in office. In
France, we will examine the recent rejection in the Conseil Constitutionnel of President Sarkozy’s proposed carbon tax, which had been
76
enacted by the Parliament. Last, we will consider the GCC’s abortion decisions, the first in 1975 and the second following German un77
ification in 1993. Each of these decisions provoked reaction and
debate outside of the Courts, both inside governing circles and in the
public at large, and each resulted in government reactions, bringing
about a kind of deliberative compromise among the constitutional
actors.
A. The Di Bella Treatment
In 1997 and 1998, the Italian mass media devoted significant attention to a new treatment, created by Luigi Di Bella, a medical doctor in Modena, aimed at certain types of aggressive cancers. Newsweek
78
even nominated him “Dr. of Hope.” A lot of people went to see him
and used his therapy with the hope of defeating their deadly sickness.
They also asked the government to reimburse the cost of the therapy
since Italy has a system of universal health care. After a number of
investigations, the (center-left) government, run by Romano Prodi,
refused to reimburse the patients, arguing that Di Bella’s therapy was
ineffective. There was a strong division of public opinion, and some
organizations were established to support the value of the therapy.
74
75

76
77

78

Corte Cost., 26 maggio 1998, n. 185, Giur. it.
See
Corte
Cost.,
19
ottubre
2009,
n.262,
available
at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/versioni_in_lingua/eng/attivitacorte/pronunceemassi
me/recent_judgments_2007.asp (follow “Judgment No. 202 of 2009” hyperlink) (providing an English translation on the Court’s website).
See Conseil constituionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-599DC, Dec. 29
2009, J.O. 296 (Fr.).
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1975, 39
[BVerfGE]
1
(Ger.),
available
at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/germandecision/german_abortion_decisi
on2.html (providing the English translation); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] 1993, 88 [BVerfGE] 203 (Ger.).
The Latest Tech Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 2002, at 5.
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Throughout the country, there was a debate about Di Bella’s treatment—a scientific debate and, more importantly, a popular one. It
was barely possible to have a dinner in Italy those days without being
involved in a discussion concerning Di Bella’s treatment (most of
those discussions were based on prejudices or, more likely, on nothing, but still people had opinions). Public opinion seemed to run
fairly strongly against the government’s position, and many people
thought that, in the absence of an absolute certainty about the inefficacy of the treatment in question, the government had a duty to
79
reimburse the patients using the treatment.
The constitutional court was asked to make a decision by a referral sent by the administrative Supreme Court (Consiglio di Stato). Of
course, the justices could not themselves answer the scientific question as to the effects of the therapy, but they decided to make a popular choice. The ICC opinion asserted that in the absence of certainty,
it was unconstitutional to treat the patients of Di Bella differently from
80
those who utilized other therapies which were regularly reimbursed.
The ICC, in the sentenza (or opinion) N.185 (of the year) 1998, therefore decided that the governmental decision violated Article 3 of the
81
Constitution—the principle of equality. The crucial point of the sentenza is the following:
In case of extreme therapeutic needs, if there is urgency and no alternative solution, as it is true for some oncologic pathologies, one has to take
into account that during the stretch of time the experimentation goes on
in order to verify the validity of the therapy expectations originate that
have to do with the minimum of right to health [guaranteed by Article 32
of the Italian Constitution—in that context: trying to survive]. It follows
from the principle of equality that the satisfaction of this right cannot be
82
conditional on the different economic conditions of the patients . . . . .

In other words, it is not compatible with the principle of equality
that the rich can pay to try to postpone death while the poor see their
hopes curtailed by their economic situation. The rich probably do
not care very much about reimbursement; but the poor do. And
79

80
81

82

See Eva Benelli, The Role of the Media in Steering Public Opinion on Healthcare Issues, 63
HEALTH POL. 179 (2002) (discussing the role of median and public opinion in the Di Bella case in particular).
See Corte Cost. 26 Maggio 1998, n.185.
See id. Article 3 of the Italian Constitution states that “All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social conditions.” See Art. 2 Costituzione [Cost.] [It.].
See id. Article 3 of the Italian Constitution states that “All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social conditions.” See Art. 2 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
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since the efficacy of the treatment remained unclear (at least to the
ICC and the general public), refusing to reimburse for the treatment
would be discriminatory since the rich can pay, and the poor cannot.
The decision was legally bold and politically ironic—a court with a
journalistic and popular reputation of being on the center-left rejected what appeared to be a reasonable decision (to deny reimbursement for unapproved medical procedures) of the first, republican, center-left Italian government. But the ICC was also, in this case,
deciding a question that put the citizens and the government in sharply
opposed positions, and so by overturning the governmental policy, it
was not taking an unambiguously countermajoritarian action. However, it has to be said that its decision placed an extraordinary burden
on the government’s efforts to regulate national health insurance.
Two remarks. First, it may be interesting to note that eventually it
was proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the so called Di Bella
83
therapy was absolutely inefficacious. Second, in the case we are considering, the ICC was not originating a debate, but taking a side in a
contrast between the elected branches and the public opinion supporting one party to the debate, encouraging it and postponing the
final decision by the political branches.
84

B. The Lodi Schifani and Alfano
Notoriously, the Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi has had trouble
with judges both in Italy and abroad. Since the inception of his political adventure, he has been very keen to fix these problems by enacting various pieces of legislation, making himself immune from prosecution at least while in office, where he hopes to stay forever. The
Parliament passed in June 2003 a statute (lodo Schifani) immunizing
the five highest state personalities (most importantly, the Prime Minister) from any crime or misdemeanor even antecedent to the
85
mandate, and this for the entire duration of it. The Constitutional

83

84
85

Evaluation of an Unconventional Cancer Treatment (the Di Bella Multitherapy): Results of Phase
II Trials in Italy, 318 BMJ 224 (1999) (finding that Di Bella multitherapy did not show sufficient efficacy in patients with advanced cancer to warrant further clinical testing).
This old Italian word means the agreement suggested by an arbitrator and accepted by
the parties, now used hypocritically as equivalent to a statute voted by the majority.
Legge 20 giugno 2004, n.140 (It.) (“Disposizioni per l’attuazione dell’articolo 68 della
Costituzione nonché in materia di processi penali nei confronti delle alte cariche dello
Stato”). This translates to: Act June 20, 2004, No. 140, Article 1. Provisions for implementing Article 68 of the Constitution and in criminal proceedings against the high State
offices). The Act states: “They cannot be subjected to criminal proceedings, including
any offense in the facts before taking the office or function until the termination thereof,
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Court was soon asked by ordinary judges about the compatibility of
this statute with the Constitution, and its response was to cancel this
86
provision of the statute in its sentenza n. 24 of 2004. The argument
used by the Court was, again, the principle of equality: The Prime
Minister or the President of the Constitutional Court (included in
the five highest public officials) have no special privilege vis-à-vis ordinary citizens; the law in a constitutional state is the same for everybody (notice that the statute protected the Premier from any type of
crime, including homicide, and that in Italy there is no impeachment
87
procedure for the prime minister).
The new Berlusconi government responded by getting the Parliament to enact a similar statute (lodo Alfano, from the name of the
Attorney General who introduced the bill) in June 2008 immunizing,
this time, only four high officials (excluding the President of the
88
ICC). Again, the statute was referred to the ICC within a year, and
the referral raised the same issue: Whether the new law was consistent with the equality provision (Article 3) of the Italian Constitution.
The Constitutional Court, applying this time the principle of stare decisis, which is crucial in European constitutional adjudication (contrary to what many people tend to believe in the US), cancelled the
89
statute, thereby entering into an open conflict with the elected majority. The Court could not have easily reversed the previous decision
since the statutes were so similar in nearly every respect and, in any
case, such reversals are extremely rare in Constitutional Courts. One
has to consider, moreover, that the justice who wrote the sentenza in
2004 was now, in 2009, the President of the ICC: Francesco Amirante, an old magistrate coming from the Cassation Court with no political background at all. It is also important to remember that Italian
judges are not politically appointed, but get their jobs in the same
way as ordinary civil servants, through a public competitive exam. He

86
87
88
89

the President, Senate President, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President
of Council of Ministers, the President of the Constitutional Court.”
Corte Cost. 20 gennaio 2004, n.24 (It.).
Id. See the section Considerato in diritto for the Court’s presentation of constituional reasons for its decision.
Legge 23 luglio 2008, n.124 (It.).
See
Corte
Cost.,
19
ottubre
2009,
n.
262
(It.),
available
at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/versioni_in_lingua/eng/attivitacorte/pronunceemassi
me/recent_judgments_2007.asp. (providing an English translation on the Court’s website); see also Rachel Donadio, Court Rejects Berlusconi’s Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009,
at A6 (“After deliberating for two days in a tense political climate, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the law—which grants the nation’s four highest officeholders immunity
from prosecution while in office—violated a clause in the Constitution granting citizens
equality under the law.”).
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had no reason to tarnish his reputation as a judge by signing a decision reversing the one he accepted to write for the Court five years
earlier when the material facts had remained unchanged.
The Alfani Law and the decision of the ICC were the objects of
widespread discussion and debate among citizens. To our knowledge, the ICC did not know about the leaning of public opinion, but
after the decision, a survey among the voters made the day following
the announcement (October 8, 2009) shows first that there was a
high level of public awareness of the ICC decision, and second that
the popular reaction to the decision was essentially structured by political affiliations. Here are the results (source: La Repubblica Octoth
ber 9 , 2009):

It is interesting to observe that the poll shows that the majority of
the public opinion did support the ICC decision—only those identifying with center-right parties failed to support the Court. And it may
be significant that this was also true of those who were either unaffi-
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liated with the left or right or refused to admit such an affiliation. It
seems to us that there was some kind of a public dialogue that took
place in this case (and probably also in the Schifani case, but we do
not have the data), where the public essentially came to support the
ICC’s decision, after it became apparent that there was a direct confrontation between the ICC’s interpretation of the Constitution and
the parliamentary majority. We should say that we do not know
whether the distribution of public attitudes was a cause or consequence of the ICC decision. It is very likely that those on the centerleft (and perhaps many independents) already thought that the Alfano law was a craven attempt to subvert constitutional norms even before the ICC spoke to the matter. If this was the case, once again we
have a case in which public opinion and the government are opposed
and where the ICC aligns itself with the public. But it also seems
plausible that public opinion concerning the Alfano law’s constitutionality was solidified by the Court’s ruling. If this is true, we could say
that the ICC and the government opposed, and the public solidified,
the Court’s ruling by coming to its support.
In any case, the political significance of the ruling is that because
granting immunity for the Prime Minister violated the principle of
equality, the government would need to enact a constitutional
amendment—a statute passed by the majority does not do. And of
course, the majority knows that there is no supermajority among the
elected representatives to pass such an amendment. So, it appears
that now the government is preparing a third bill, which will certainly
be approved by the Parliament and will again soon be sent to the
90
Constitutional Court. Only the electoral result of the next election
can tell us if the Court will again be able to stop the attempt of the
government to subvert the constitutional order of the peninsula. But
it seems that in this struggle, the Constitutional Court has a good deal
of popular support, so even if the conservatives prevail in the next
election, it is not evident that the government can succeed in getting
immunity for its high officials. We may add a coda here reminding
the reader that the entire constitutional adjudication mechanism Italian style is essentially based on a dialogue between the ordinary
judges who send questions to the constitutional court, that the ICC
answers in ways that generally adhere to its own cumulated precedents. The ordinary judges then apply the rulings of the ICC in the
specific cases before them. Nowadays, this relationship tends to be
very cooperative. Indeed, the decisions (sentenze) addressed by the
90

th

See La Repubblica, April 15 2010.
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ICC to the ordinary judges are called “auto-applicative,” which means
“self-enforcing.” Actually, they are not self-enforcing, but enforced by
ordinary courts. Nonetheless, the ICC’s expectation is that they will
be enforced, which, as we have seen, might not be the case if the ad91
dressees were the political branches.
C. The Taxe Carbone
We saw in the first Italian example (the so-called Di Bella treatment) a supposed “center-left” Court opposing a center-left government. Nowadays, in France, the Constitutional Council, on the verge
of becoming a true court after the constitutional reform of 2008,
92
commonly believed to be on the right of the political spectrum, has
been regularly opposing (rejecting, modifying, or forcing the government to present a new bill taking into account the objections of
93
the CC) decisions of the conservative president (Sarkozy). The last
example is the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel to strike down
94
the taxe carbone.
It is important to say a few words about the political background
of this case. Like Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy had a solid majority in the representative assemblies at the time that the carbon tax was
introduced by the government. In fact, he enjoyed a quasi “constituent” majority in the Congrès (the French term for constituent assembly encompassing the two houses of the Parliament), and he was,
notably, able to pass a constitutional reform in 2008 (notwithstanding
95
the opposition of the socialist group in parliament). But he did not
91
92

93

94
95

See ITALIAN CONST. C., http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/versioni_in_lingua/eng/
lacortecostituzionale/cosaelacorte/cosaelacorte.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
Eight of the nine members of the French Constitutional Court in December 2009 had
been appointed by conservative presidents, house speakers and presidents of the Senate
(after March 2010, all of them are of conservative nomination).
Some recent relevant examples are:
a) Hadopi, a statute concerning the copyright on internet. See Conseil constitutionnel
[CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-590DC, Oct. 29, 2009, J.O. 18292.
b) Electoral gerrymandering. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court]
decision No. 2008-573DC, Jan. 14, 2009. J.O.724.
c) Detention after the imprisonment. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2008-562DC, Feb. 21, 2008, J.O. ___ (Fr.). [rétention de sûreté:
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/lesdecisions/2008/decisions-par-date/2008/2008-562-dc/communique-depresse.12323.html ].
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-599DC, Dec. 29,
2009, J.O. 296 (Fr.).
Pasquale Pasquino, The New Constitutional Adjudication in France: The Reform of the Referral
to the French Constitutional Council in Light of the Italian Model, 3 INDIAN J. CONST. L., 105–
117 (2009), http://www.astrid-online.it/.
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enjoy majority support among voters, at least not by the time the carbon tax issue became a political crisis. According to a recent survey
(Spring 2010), two out of three French, adult citizens under 65 are
96
hostile to the President. And the carbon tax proposal was apparently unpopular too, since it was imposed mainly on households and
drivers; the bill passed by the conservative majority in the French Parliament exempted the big and industrial polluters from the tax. This
seems another fairly clear case of opposed parliamentary and popular
majorities, which we can call a “double majority.” Once the governmental proposal was passed in the parliament, the Socialists immediately referred it to the CC on the grounds that the burdens it imposed infringed on the constitutional equality principle. In its arrêt
(judicial opinion), the French CC agreed and censured the provi97
sions of the statute which infringed upon the principle of equality.
The rapid pace of French constitutional adjudication makes it impossible to develop a public debate in the short time between the
vote in the Parliament and the decision of the CC. This decision of
the CC, however, generated a huge debate in the newspapers, something that happens rarely in France concerning the CC. And it was
especially so since shifting the tax toward industrial polluters was likely to be very divisive for the government’s majority. In any case, the
government presented a new bill in January 2010 that proposed to
remove some, but certainly not all, of the business exemptions
(though still taxing businesses at a lower rate than households) and
98
continued to exempt agriculture, fishing, and transport altogether.
It was not clear at the time whether those changes would have satis96

97

98

See, e.g., David Gauthier-Villars, Sarkozy’s Rating Falls, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703523204575129902932797976.ht
ml.
See Bastien Hugues, Le Conseil Constitutionnel Retoque La Taxe Carbone, LE FIGARO, Dec. 30,
2009,
available
at
http://www.lefigaro.fr/environnement/2009/12/29/0102920091229ARTFIG00513-le-conseil-constitutionnel-retoque-la-taxe-carbonne-.php The article states:
The Constitutional Council has notably remarked that “completely exempted
from carbon tax were the emissions of thermic plants producing electricity as well
as the emissions of the 1018 most polluting industrial sites” (refineries, cement
works, coke plants . . . ), “the emissions of the airplanes” and also “those of the
public transportation of passengers. These exemptions would have had as a consequence that 93% of the emissions from industrial origin, with the exception of
fuel, be exonerated from the carbon tax” according to the decision. The tax
would have had hence “an effect essentially on fuel and the heating products,
which are only one of the sources of carbon dioxide.”
Id. (translated by the author).
Pierre Melquiot, Taxe Carbone, Retour Prévu Le Ler Juillet 2010, ACTUALITES NEWS ENV’T,
Jan. 01, 2010, http://www.actualites-news-environnement.com/22665-Taxe-carboneretour-prevu-juillet-2010.html.
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fied the CC in the event that the new bill was enacted. In the face of
strong public opposition to the legislation, and after a large defeat in
the regional elections, the government gave up on the legislation, indicating its intention to pursue European Union-wide legislation for a
99
harmonized tax.
Although it is fairly rare for the French to have an extensive public debate before a statute is discussed and approved by the representatives, such a debate did occur in the case of the law forbidding
girls under the age of seventeen to wear headscarves in public
100
schools.
Public opinion largely supported the project, as did the
101
major political parties. As a result, the statute was never referred by
the parliamentary minority to the CC since the Socialists were not inclined to refer the statute to the CC. Thus, we cannot really know for
102
sure how the CC would have ruled on this statute.
As can be seen in the previous examples, in both Italy and France,
there are frequently conflicts between the government and its majority and the organs in charge of the guardianship of the constitution
(the CC). In this conflict, a third party—the citizens—can sometimes
play an important role. By expressing their opinions, mostly through
surveys, they can diminish the capacity of their representatives to
credibly speak in their names. This diminution allows more opportunities for the CC to check the elected government. The golden age
of absolute representation, when the Parliaments could claim a monopoly over the interpretation of the popular will, is definitely over,
both on the old continent and in the United States. Constitutional
pluralism, rather than popular constitutionalism, is the name of the
game. The constitutional dialogue now takes place among three
(and not just two) partners.
This is not to say that a richer dialogue between a Constitutional
Court and public opinion is impossible in Europe, where the CC itself responds pretty directly to public views. Indeed, we may consider
the role of the German FCC in the area of abortion, where it has
twice played an important role in regulating women’s access to abor99
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Isabelle de Foucaud, Le Gouvernement Reporte Sine Die La Taxe Carbone, LE FIGARO, Mar. 23,
2010,
http://www.lefigaro.fr/impots/2010/03/23/05003-20100323ARTFIG00518-legouvernement-abandonne-la-taxe-carbone-.php.
Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFCIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190,
translated in 4 WORLD LAW BULL. 14 (2004).
See The War of the Headscarves, The Economist, Feb. 5, 2004, www.economist.com/
node/2404691?story_id=2404691
It is very likely that, thanks to the possibility of ex post review introduced in March 2010,
the statute will reach the French Constitutional Court at some point in the future.
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tion services in various ways. We may start by drawing attention to an
important difference between the role of the United States Supreme
Court and the European constitutional courts. In the American constitutional structure, legislative power is divided between the national
government and the member states. This is hardly the case in France
and Italy, notwithstanding a limited, recent devolution of local legis103
lation to the “regions” in the latter country.
Even in Germany,
which has had a federal structure since its inception, the legislative
power of the Laender is much more limited than that held by the
member states of the United States.
This matters in our discussion, since for our comparison we need
to presume that many of the important decisions made by the United
States Supreme Court have to do with the strong federal structure of
the political and constitutional system of the U.S. Consider the Roe
decision, in which the United States Supreme Court overturned a
Texas law that barred access to abortions unless necessary to save the
104
life of the mother. In the absence of a federal statute, a citizen may
claim that the state statute is infringing upon her rights guaranteed
by the federal constitution. It seems difficult to speak in these cases
of a countermajoritarian decision given that no majoritarian position
has been expressed at the national level—although there may be a
majoritarian position expressed at the state level—and of course,
there may be a national majority opposed to the Court’s decision. In
this case, Hans Kelsen would say that the Supreme Court acted as a
positive legislator, since in cancelling a state statute it created a new
federal legal regime (i.e., the Roe regulatory framework). Importantly, in this case, the Court itself was divided, and it published a range
105
of opinions including strong and articulate dissents. This not only
encouraged public debate, but, to some extent, guided it by articulating, in legal/constitutional terms, grounds for opposing the Roe regime.
In highly centralized countries like France and, until recently, Italy, there is essentially one legislator—the national parliament. Because no dissents are permitted in the constitutional courts, the perfect equivalent of Roe is very unlikely given the federal aspects of that
decision. Nonetheless, as we have shown, even in these nonfederal
systems, the CC decisions sometimes produce a public debate and
force the government (i.e., the majority in the Parliament) to revisit a
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This shift may have important consequences but it is too early to say.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See e.g., id. at 171–78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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policy decision. But Germany, which is not only a federal system, but
also one in which there are important regional differences on some
issues, provides an interesting case in which the CC itself may be
asked to reconsider its settled constitutional views in light of public
debate.
C. Abortion in Germany
In 1975, following a (French-style) referral to the FCC by the CDU
and several Laender governments, the FCC struck down a newly
enacted (social democratic) statute which legalized abortion in the
first trimester, saying that abortion must always be illegal under Ar106
ticle 2 of the Basic Law in order to protect human life. At the same
time, the court allowed for non-prosecution in certain circumstances,
107
such as when the health of the mother was threatened. The ruling
(by the First Senate of the CC) was internally divisive. The Senate divided 5-2, and there was, for the first time in the CC, a published dissent (written by the only woman among the justices, Wiltraut Rupp108
von Brünneck). And while there was a significant political reaction
to this ruling, especially in stimulating the formation of women’s
groups, the FCC doctrine remained firm until unification with the
109
former East Germany.
Eastern Germany had long permitted abortion on demand during
the first trimester, and there is little doubt that the policy was popular
110
there.
For that reason, the conservative, German abortion law became a contentious issue in the reunification negotiations because
negotiators for the East feared the imposition of the restrictive West
German abortion law. As a result, the matter of a new abortion law
was deferred until after the unification and referred to the first post111
unification parliament.
The parliament then enacted an abortion
106
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Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 1 (Ger.), available at
http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/life/39bverfge1.html (providing an English translation).
Id.
Joyce Marie Mushaben, Concession or Compromise? The Politics of Abortion in United Germany,
6 GER. POLS. 70, 74 (1997).
See id. at 76 (“The Wall’s collapse in November 1989 sparked a new debate over women’s
right to self-determination.”).
For a careful analysis, see Lee Ann Banaszak, East-West Differences in German Abortion Opinion, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 545, 548–49 (1998). Banaszak argues that differences in East
German abortion attitudes were mostly shaped by the employment status of the women,
whereas religious attitudes were a more powerful influence in the west.
See Mushaben, supra note 108, at 77, Mushaben writes:
Fearing that irreconcilable differences over abortion might deprive Germans of an
extraordinary window of opportunity, Chancellor Kohl ordered his negotiators to
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law in 1992 which permitted legal abortions in the first trimester fol112
lowing mandatory counseling. The legislation was opposed by most
conservatives, but the party was divided, and some conservatives (including Angela Merkel) from the eastern Laender/states supported it.
This law was clearly inconsistent with the FCC’s earlier ruling that
abortion is always illegal under Article 2, and, not surprisingly, on an
abstract referral by the CDU and the Bavarian government in 1993,
the FCC struck down the statute on the grounds that it was inconsis113
tent with the dignity of human life required by the Basic Law.
Again, the Bundestag, with strengthened SDP representation following the 1994 elections, was forced to come up with a new law, which it
114
did in 1995. While the new law largely followed the FCC’s requirements—especially in making abortion illegal in all cases, but outlining circumstances where it would not be prosecuted—it ignored the
FCC’s requirements in some other circumstances, such that it remains vulnerable to overruling at least in principle. Importantly,
however, the government made sure that its language was acceptable
to all the major political parties so there would be no referral on abstract review. It is possible, therefore, that the 1995 legislation is inconsistent with Article 2, or at least the CC’s interpretation of that Article, but it remains in place nevertheless because it cannot easily be
challenged (at least so long as a fetus cannot bring a constitutional
complaint). Moreover, it is likely that the CC is not only aware of, but
accepts this basic situation.
Moreover, the CC’s action and parliamentary responses have generated significant reactions at the state level. Several of the Eastern
exclude the issue from the formal treaty. Saxony had threatened to withdraw from
the accession process should western prohibitions become automatically binding;
and GDR Minister for Women and Family, Dr [sic] Christa Schmidt (CDU), joined
the Independent Women’s Union in an August 1990 Volkskammer campaign,
pushing for a non-criminalisation[sic] guarantee before unity became official.
The Unity Treaty of 6 September 1990 offered but a vague assurance that lawmakers would not turn back the clock on rights established in the GDR.
112

113

114

Id.
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Jul. 27, 1992, BUNDESGESETZBLATT § 218a
(Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de; see also Christina P. Schlegel,
Landmark in German Abortion Law: The German 1995 Compromise Compared with English Law,
11 INT. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 36, 40 (1997).
See Mushaben, supra note 108, at 80. Mushaben states:
The verdict was six to two against the reform; one woman and five men struck
down the law, with Böckenförde issuing a separate opinion. Chief Justice Mahrenholz was one of two dissenters. The judgment imposed a legal framework for
abortion consisting of fine distinctions with major consequences; it declared abortion rechtswidrig aber straffrei, that is “illegal but free from punishment.”
Id.
See generally Schlegel, supra note 112.
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Laender acted to provide payments for abortion services to non-poor
women who could not be reimbursed by the national health system.
And, in 1996, Bavaria enacted additional legal restrictions on abor115
tion.
Georg Vanberg quotes one of the judges (on the Senate that
handed down the ruling):
There are significant differences between the 1975 and 1992 decisions.
The differences can largely be explained by the desire to find a solution
that would be acceptable to everyone. . . . That was a very conscious effort; we were looking for a solution. Of course, the court didn’t take an
116
opinion poll, but public attitudes did play a role.

Vanberg notes that public opinion research in Germany suggests
that FCC doctrine (abortion is illegal but, following mandatory counselling, is not prosecuted in specific circumstances) and the 1995
117
compromise are in line with plurality opinion in Germany. In any
event, the 1995 legislation stands.
It seems clear that abortion was an unusual issue for the FCC in
many ways. First, the Court has held to a strict interpretation of Article 2 of the Basic Law, protecting human dignity, and has consistently said that it applies to human life in the fetal stage. Second,
public opinion was both attentive and aroused because the legislation
split the major parties, which is why the 1975 and 1992 cases arrived
at the FCC by means of a referral by the Christian Democrats and
some of the state governments. Finally, public attitudes toward abortion were different in Eastern Germany than in the West, and the
1992 legislation was enacted at the historically significant moment of
reunification. In this case, members of the FCC probably felt obliged
to pay more attention to public attitudes than they might in other
circumstances. In other cases, there would be much less public attention to an FCC ruling since many of these arise not on the basis of an
immediate abstract referral of legislation to the Court, but rather
much later following a constitutional complaint. As a result, there
would not be any sense of confrontation between the legislature or
well-formed public opinion pressing on the Court (as there was in the
abortion cases).
Another feature of German abortion legislation is that, unlike in
the U.S., the relevant legislation has generally been enacted by the
115
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See Mushaben, supra note 108, at 83 (“In June 1996 the Bavarian Landtag introduced a
‘supplementary’ law compelling women to reveal their names as well as their reasons for
ending a pregnancy . . . .”).
GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 128 (2005) (citation and quotation omitted).
Id. (observing that the legislation largely followed the prescriptions of the 1975 ruling).
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national parliament rather than the states. We should note, however,
that following the 1995 legislation, there has been some Laender-level
legislation seeking to regulate abortion. Some of these laws may yet
come before the FCC, so it is not at all clear that the issue has really
been completely settled. As we mentioned earlier, the national abortion laws have arrived at the FCC by means of a political referral and
not a constitutional complaint. It seems possible, however, that restrictive Laender legislation may provoke constitutional complaints in
the future.
In any case, from the evidence examined here, it seems that that
the FCC has effectively permitted a political/constitutional compromise, allowing women effective access to abortion services during the
first trimester while, at the same time, preserving its traditional interpretation of the Basic Law. This is not to say that the FCC felt or
reacted to political pressures to reach this compromise. It seems likely, as indeed the quotation from Vanberg’s text suggests, that the
members of the Court sought to find a solution to the regional conflict on this issue that allowed the FCC at the same time to preserve
the central core of its constitutional jurisprudence—which is focused
on preserving human life and dignity.
V. CONCLUSION
Barry Friedman has made an important contribution in exploring
the nature of American democracy and the evolving role of the Supreme Court in that democracy. His idea—that the Court has effectively encouraged public argument and deliberation—is provocative
because he has offered powerful historical evidence to support it.
But it also provokes a rethinking of the character of American democracy itself by seeing countermajoritarian courts as enhancing its
deliberative aspects. We are fairly confidant that Friedman would
rush to qualify this statement, acknowledging that on some particular
issues and for some period of time, either popular or legislative majorities are prevented from choosing policies they want. But he
would also insist that in the sweep of history, these interludes are fairly short, however painful they may seem at the time. On the whole,
then, we have a policy-making process that stays roughly in step with
public opinion over the medium or long run where constitutional issues come to inform popular debates and deliberations about policy.
Moreover, there is reason to think that something similar seems to
be taking place in other systems that have introduced systems of constitutional adjudication. Since the Second World War, a growing
number of countries have adopted such systems throughout the
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world. Some of these courts may not have been very effective, of
course, and it is too early to say precisely which ones will “succeed” in
Friedman’s sense in enhancing the quality of their democracies. But
we have argued that at least in Germany, Italy, and France, the CC’s
have been involved in generating dialogue with other governmental
departments and sometimes with the people themselves.
Obviously, this process is likely to work best on highly salient policies—policies that touch people in their everyday lives. Ordinary
people do not have the time to pay attention to everything, but where
a governmental decision affects their lives or central values, they can
sometimes be induced to pay attention and to form and express opinions either directly or through intermediaries. Most of the issues we
have discussed in this Article meet this criterion, and we think most
of those that Friedman discusses do, too.
We have also noted that the key theoretical ideas that we have explored here—democracy, deliberation, and countermajoritarianism—are complex, both descriptively and normatively, and need
more theoretical development than we could give them here. Of
course, much more remains to be seen from and learned about democracies with constitutional courts. Having made these qualifications, it appears plausible that Friedman’s hypothesis—that a countermajoritarian power can increase public deliberation—has much to
be said in its support.

